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 I.-63 
THE COMMON LAW AS A FORCE  
FOR WOMEN 
BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD* 
Abstract: This essay introduces a collection of Symposium Essays examining 
Anita Bernstein’s book, The Common Law Inside the Female Body (Cambridge 
University Press, 2019). Professor Bernstein explores the common law’s recogni-
tion of both rights and liberties, highlighting in particular negative liberties such 
as the right to be left undisturbed. The Symposium Essays test and explore Pro-
fessor Bernstein’s thesis as applied to the right to be free from rape and unwanted 
pregnancies. Grounded in perspectives informed by the study of tort law, legal 
history, intellectual property, constitutional law, and critical race theory, these Es-
says—together with Professor Bernstein’s book—suggest that the common law 
has been underutilized as a legal strategy to protect women’s rights. 
For my ally is the Force, and a powerful ally it is.1 
Close your eyes. Feel it. The light . . . it’s always been there. It will guide 
you.2 
In the final sequence of Star Wars: Episode III—Revenge of the Sith, after 
a brutal battle with Jedi master Obi-Wan Kenobi, Darth Vader learns that his 
beloved wife, Padmé Amidala, has died.3 A bootleg Chinese version of the film 
translated Vader’s mournful cry, “Nooooooo!” as “Do not want!” and an inter-
net meme was born.4 Used mostly with comic effect, the phrase “Do not want” 
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 * Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. A companion set of essays 
appears in a Symposium on Anita Bernstein’s The Common Law Inside the Female Body, 114 NW. U.L. 
REV. ONLINE 131 (2019), https://northwesternlawreview.org/nulr-online/all-content/ [https://perma.
cc/9ZYE-C44X]. We had more colleagues eager to participate in the conversation about the book than 
could be accommodated by one journal. Thanks to the student editors at the Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 
(especially Danielle Berkowsky) and the B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. (especially Emma Coffey and Dan 
Brutti) for collaborating to bring this cross-journal project to fruition. 
 1 STAR WARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1980) (Yoda explaining the 
Force to Luke). 
 2 STAR WARS: EPISODE VII—THE FORCE AWAKENS (Lucasfilm 2015) (Maz Kanata explaining 
the Force to Rey). 
 3 STAR WARS: EPISODE III—REVENGE OF THE SITH (Lucasfilm 2005). 
 4 See Memes/Revenge of the Sith, TVTROPES.ORG, https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/
Memes/RevengeOfTheSith [https://perma.cc/B9DD-8MA3] (describing the scene as having been 
adopted in culture “as a way (mostly in jest) to show great disapproval over things on forums and 
message boards”); Robert Quigley, The Origin of “Do Not Want,” THE MARY SUE (May 4, 2011, 
2:16 PM), https://www.themarysue.com/do-not-want-origin/ [https://perma.cc/4PYB-MCSP]. 
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expresses clear disapproval or dislike.5 In The Common Law Inside the Female 
Body, Anita Bernstein uses the phrase with all seriousness to argue convincing-
ly that the common law is a rich source of women’s rights.6 Bernstein explores 
the common law’s recognition of both rights and liberties, highlighting in par-
ticular negative liberties such as the rights to “withdraw and repel; to refuse 
invitations and offers and orders; and to separate oneself from external 
claims.”7 In Bernstein’s powerful analysis, the common law right to “reject 
invasion and intrusion” translates into a right to be free from rape and the right 
to terminate a pregnancy.8 Quite simply, a woman has complete dominion over 
her own body, including robust rights to “say no to invasions she deems un-
welcome.”9 
To explore Professor Bernstein’s outstanding contribution to a nuanced 
understanding of women’s rights, I invited colleagues with diverse interests, 
backgrounds and experiences to contribute to a collection of reflective es-
says.10 The authors include full-time faculty members with academic special-
ties in Torts, Intellectual Property, Legal History, Environmental Law, Proper-
ty, Family Law and Constitutional Law. Scholars with different scholarly per-
spectives ask where (and whether) the common law can be understood as a 
strong ground for asserting women’s rights. 
The first essay in the collection is Professor Nadia Ahmad’s Re-Reading 
Anita Bernstein’s The Common Law Inside the Female Body from the Per-
spective of the Central Park Five. Her analysis is inspired by the coincidence 
of her reading Bernstein’s book at the same time that she watched Ava Du-
Vernay’s Netflix documentary, “When They See Us.”11 That film explores the 
wrongful conviction of five Black and Latino teenagers for the assault and rape 
of a white female jogger who was left for dead in Manhattan’s Central Park.12 
The five boys, now men, had fully served their sentences before the police 
identified the crime’s real perpetrator and those who were wrongfully accused, 
convicted, and imprisoned were exonerated.13 Bernstein describes criminal 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Do Want/Do Not Want, KNOWYOURMEME.COM, https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/do-want-
do-not-want [https://perma.cc/WQ6G-4WXN]. 
 6 See generally ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY (2019).  
 7 Id. at 7. 
 8 Id. at 7, 28–29. 
 9 Id. at 28. 
 10 See also Symposium on Anita Bernstein’s The Common Law Inside the Female Body, 114 NW. 
L. REV. ONLINE 131 (2019), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr_online/275/ [https://
perma.cc/BT75-RLAT].  
 11 Nadia B. Ahmad, Re-Reading Anita Bernstein’s The Common Law Inside the Female Body 
from the Perspective of the Central Park Five, 61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-73.  
 12 Id. at I.-73–74.  
 13 See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, 5 Exonerated in Central Park Jogger Case Agree to Settle Suit for 
$40 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2014), https://nyti.ms/TcaJIr [https://perma.cc/4VG2-KTN2] (not-
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punishment as one of the exceptions to condoned self-regard, as it is based on 
a prior voluntary (and wrongful) act.14 Although Ahmad recognizes that state 
and federal criminal laws are largely codified, her focus on the Central Park 
Five case reminds the reader that the operation of the criminal law system is 
deeply flawed. The five men suffered immediate losses of liberty as well as 
lifetime repercussions for the voluntary (and wrongful) acts of others—the ac-
tual perpetrator of the crimes and the prosecutors and others who brought 
about and facilitated the wrongful convictions and incarceration. 
Professor Ann Bartow takes up Bernstein’s analysis through the lens of 
legal realism in The Female Legal Realist Inside the Common Law.15 Bartow 
situates herself squarely within that tradition, explaining that judges “consider 
not only abstract rules, but also social interests, public policy, the personal 
characteristics of the parties, and a personal theory of justice when deciding a 
case.”16 This realist perspective is shared by contributors to various Feminist 
Judgments projects, a loose collective of global scholars working on rewriting 
judicial opinions from a feminist perspective.17 These projects seek to show 
that by using the same facts and legal precedent in effect at the time of the 
original decision, a judge informed by a feminist perspective could have 
reached a different result or employed different reasoning (or both).18 In The 
Female Legal Realist Inside the Common Law, Bartow, an early contributor to 
the U.S. Feminist Judgments project,19 explains how she understood as a law 
student (and now understands as a law professor) just how important a judge’s 
unarticulated notions of fairness can be to any judicial decision.20 Bartow then 
turns to consider limitations of artificial intelligence systems. Some of their 
known weaknesses arise from the fact that any system’s “knowledge” depends 
on repetition and training. If not carefully designed, that training unintentional-
                                                                                                                           
ing that four of the wrongfully accused men each served approximately seven years in prison, and that 
one wrongfully accused man spent approximately thirteen years in prison). 
 14 BERNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 56–74. 
 15 Ann Bartow, The Female Legal Realist Inside the Common Law, 61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-
82–88 (2020). 
 16 Id. at I.-85. 
 17 See U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, U. NEV. WILLIAM S. BOYD L. SCH. (2020), https://law.
unlv.edu/us-feminist-judgments/series-projects [https://perma.cc/4EJL-C3L4].  
 18 See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford et al., Teaching with Feminist Judgments: A Global Conversa-
tion, 38 L. & INEQ. 1, 3 n.2 (2019) (describing feminist judgments projects overall and the various 
projects completed or ongoing in Canada, England, the United States, Ireland, Australia, New Zea-
land, Scotland, India, Africa, and Mexico, along with a pan-European project).  
 19 See Ann Bartow, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: 
REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 430–46 (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda 
L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds. 2016). 
 20 Bartow, supra note 15, at I.-85. Bartow’s essay incidentally includes a wonderful description of 
presidential candidate—then law professor—Elizabeth Warren illustrating this point during the Con-
tracts class in which Bartow was a student. Warren famously performed a dance move that Warren 
called the “equity shuffle.” Id. at I.-85 & n.3. 
I.-66 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
ly may cause the AI system to replicate gender bias in evaluating job candi-
dates, to give just one example.21 This weakness in artificial intelligence con-
trasts with the “human instinct for fairness, as ephemeral as it might be” that 
motivates the common law, in both Bartow’s and Bernstein’s readings.22 
Consider next Professor Deborah Dinner’s essay, Seeking Liberty, Find-
ing Patriarchy: The Common Law’s Historical Legacy.23 Dinner begins with 
the observation that Bernstein’s book “poses a dramatic challenge to the con-
ventional wisdom that the common law oppressed women historically and 
holds minimal relevance for women’s liberation today.”24 Dinner reads Bern-
stein as using history in three different ways: first, to demonstrate that the 
common law’s past failures are due to exogenous interpretations or applica-
tions, rather than the common law tradition itself; second, to illustrate that the 
common law has always served women’s interests in some way; and third, to 
cite the common law’s past commitments as evidence that it can further wom-
en’s equality in the present (and future).25 Dinner then pushes the conversation 
further. Even if the reader assumes that Bernstein’s assessment of the common 
law is entirely accurate, Dinner asks how understanding patriarchy as one of 
the central features of the common law might lead to a different result or 
framework.26 Dinner points out that individual negative liberties—such as a 
right to not have one’s body invaded against one’s will—are quite different 
from group rights such as human rights to housing and healthcare.27 For Din-
ner, Bernstein’s work serves as a starting point for thinking carefully about in 
whom (or what) the range of possible liberties, rights, and responsibilities may 
reside, along with the common law inside the female body. 
Professor Lolita Buckner Inniss draws on her wide-ranging and deep 
knowledge of legal history and philosophy in (Un)Common Law and the Fe-
male Body, adding layers to Bernstein’s common law framework.28 Inniss 
notes the ways that Bernstein’s work “seeks to reduce or even eliminate some 
of the distance between formalist legal approaches that are at the foundation of 
most traditional common law approaches and legal realist approaches more 
typically found in feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory, and other critical 
approaches to the law.”29 Although Inniss is careful not to situate Bernstein’s 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id. at I.-86.  
 22 Id. at I.-87.  
 23 Deborah Dinner, Seeking Liberty, Finding Patriarchy: The Common Law’s Historical Legacy, 
61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-89–94 (2020). 
 24 Id. at I.-89.  
 25 Id. at I.-89–92.  
 26 Id. at I.-92–94.  
 27 Id. at I.-93–94.  
 28 Lolita Buckner Inniss, (Un)Common Law and the Female Body, 61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-95–
104 (2020). 
 29 Id. at I.-97. 
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book “squarely among the works of legal realists,” Inniss notes the monumen-
tal contribution that Bernstein makes to equality discourse through the simple 
assertion that “the common law serves to liberate women.”30 Inniss compli-
cates Bernstein’s historic account of the common law by noting that early 
American women’s freedom to terminate pregnancies was limited by self-
reported “quickening,” or perceptions of fetal movement.31 Inniss asks im-
portant questions about the relationship between women’s negative liberty 
rights in their own bodies and capitalism writ large. The common law, Inniss 
explains, has interceded to protect women against bodily intrusion most often 
in cases “either where women and their capacities were deemed the personal 
property of men, or where women’s bodies or capacities created undue, addi-
tional, or indeed any burden on the public fisc.”32 By adding these types of 
details (and the allusion in her Essay’s title to British humorist A.P. Herbert),33 
Inniss shores up Bernstein’s claim that there is nothing uncommon about using 
the common law to advance women’s interests; indeed the common law has 
had the ability to do so all along. 
Professor Katharine Silbaugh’s contribution, The Common Law Inside a 
Social Hierarchy: Power or Reason?34 likens Bernstein’s scholarly “thorough-
ness, depth and care” to the common law tradition itself, “in that so many of 
her ideas are carefully qualified, going as far as they go only, with generous 
room for debate explicitly set out at all turns.”35 Silbaugh illuminates Bern-
stein’s grounding of her theory of women’s rights to be free from intrusions or 
threats from others. Silbaugh is persuaded that this is an effective framework 
for women’s right to not be raped, but she wonders whether the common law’s 
consistent failure to protect women and its support for the “profound, trans-
gressive violence of slavery” signal the system’s fundamental flaws, as op-
posed to representing aberrational examples of misinterpretation of the com-
mon law.36 Bernstein herself notes the incompatibility of slavery with common 
law values.37 But where Bernstein sees misapplication, Silbaugh asks whether 
there might lurk intentional design.38 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. at I.-95. 
 31 Id. at I.-101.  
 32 Id. at I.-103.  
 33 Id. at I.-95.  
 34 Katharine Silbaugh, The Common Law Inside a Social Hierarchy: Power or Reason?, 61 
B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-105–11 (2020). 
 35 Id. at I.-105.  
 36 Id. at I.-108–09.  
 37 BERNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27. 
 38 Silbaugh, supra note 34, at I.-109 (“The alternative explanation . . . between reality and faithful 
reasoning is that the common law is an elegant tool in the pantheon of tools used to create and defend 
social, economic, and civic hierarchy.”). 
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The five essays presented here take seriously that “do not want” is an im-
portant legal move. Common law principles such as the lack of a duty to res-
cue and the absence of a legal obligation to “perform what someone else thinks 
is an obligation without consideration” form the basis for recognizing women’s 
legal right to say no to bodily intrusions—whether rape or an unwanted preg-
nancy.39 In this sense, the common law is like the Jedi Force, described by Maz 
Kanata in counseling Ren. Just as the Force has “always been there” within 
Ren, common law principles have “always been there” to ground women’s 
claims.40 Yet like Ren, who must look within herself to discover the “light” 
that is the Force, women and their allies need to uncover the potential of the 
common law as a source of future strength. Like the Force, the common law 
may turn out to be a tremendous tool for good. Do want. 
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 40 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
